(Yicai) Jan. 23 -- The United States forcibly arrested Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros at the beginning of this year. This was the first practical action of the Trump administration’s new national security strategy, reflecting profound changes in the country’s diplomatic philosophy and implementation methods.

Reshaping US Diplomacy

‘Hemisphere first’ means reshaping the order of the Western Hemisphere. The actions taken against Venezuela fully demonstrate that the US is once again placing ‘hemisphere first’ at the core of its global diplomatic strategy to prevent powers from outside the Western Hemisphere from exerting significant influence in key areas of Latin America.

“We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the US,” said Marco Antonio Rubio, US Secretary of State.

‘Big Stick policy first’ means using coercive measures instead of multilateral consultations. The US action completely bypassed the United Nations this time, as the country did not seek international authorization or the consensus of allies, created an established fact through unilateral actions, and then demanded that the outside world adapt to the reality.

This demonstration of force shows the power of the Big Stick policy and conveys a deterrent signal throughout the region -- in its core interests, the US will directly use hard power to shape political outcomes.

‘Strategic resources first’ implies fully making energy and infrastructure safe. After taking action, the US promptly intervened in Venezuela’s oil exports and shipping nodes, effectively controlling the flow of crude oil and rebuilding the energy distribution mechanism.

This approach is consistent with the US policy orientation in Latin America of forcing out foreign companies involved in infrastructure construction, defines energy, ports, and infrastructure in Latin America as strategic resources to ‘Make America Great Again,’ and makes economic elements politicized and safe.

In summary, ‘Hemisphere first’ defines the key spatial boundaries, ‘Big Stick policy first’ demonstrates the main action methods, and ‘Strategic resources first’ locks in the key control targets. Together, they constitute the basic content of reshaping US diplomacy with the ‘America First’ approach.

US Strategic Competition Against China Has Never Subsided

‘Hemisphere first’ is not an isolated contraction but the extension of global competition against China. The US is always proceeding with regional strategies with a filter of competition against China.

From earlier repeatedly highlighting the so-called ‘control risk’ of China over the Panama Canal, to later regarding the economic and energy cooperation between China and Venezuela as a ‘geostrategic threat,’ and then claiming that ‘Greenland is covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place,’ the US has been incorporating regional issues into the framework of the China-US competition.

China is one of the main audiences of this operation, Ryan C. Berg said, adding that Trump ultimately hopes to weaken China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. Ryan C. Berg is the director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

‘Big Stick Policy first’ reflects the upgrading of tools under the pressure of competition with China. For a considerable period of time in the past, the US tended to restrain China’s external expansion through rule-making, alliance coordination, and institutional arrangements. But now, the US is no longer satisfied with the indirect constraints by these tools but is attempting to re-establish the credibility of deterrence through controllable coercive actions, forcing more countries to take sides.

‘Strategic resources first’ directly points to the core factor of competition with China, which is technology. And behind it is the competition over control of key energy and strategic resources. For the US, the security of advanced industries, such as high-end manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors, ultimately depends on its degree of autonomy and the controllability in the fields of energy and key minerals.

Therefore, reducing reliance on China has moved from trade-level adjustments to a core issue of national and industrial security. From Venezuela to Greenland, the US close attention to energy, minerals, and key transportation routes is in line with its policy logic of promoting the de-Sinicization of supply chains, friendshoring, and the Minerals Security Partnership globally.

Negative Effects of US Actions and Resilience of China-Latin America Relationship

The rise of the US influence and the reshaping of the regional order will undoubtedly pose significant challenges to China’s relationship with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. But we still need to recognize that the actions of the US are also having adverse effects. After years of development, the China-Latin America relationship has already grown a certain degree of resilience.

The inconsistency of the US foreign policy, the one-sided selection of international rules, and the tendency to abuse coercive means can create a short-term deterrent effect. But in the long run, it will bring multiple negative effects to the US itself.

Firstly, they will intensify anti-US sentiment in the region. The colonial mentality exposed by the ‘New Monroe Doctrine’ and the bullying tactics demonstrated by the US actions against Venezuela have sparked even stronger anti-US sentiments among Latin American society. More people are beginning to question whether the US can be trusted.

Secondly, the pressure for ineffective regional governance will be passed back to the US. Restricting the development of cooperation in certain fields under the pretext of pan-security will not only delay the process of Latin American countries improving their infrastructure but also solidify their lagging economic development and single-industrial-structure problems. Eventually, through forms such as immigration pressure, the governance pressure will be transmitted back to the US.

Thirdly, the limitations of the US economic cooperation with Latin America have also been fully exposed. The US private sector has long lacked systematic investment in large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects in Latin America. The unstable situation and high risks have made the US companies more reluctant. The negative response of US oil company executives to Trump’s request to invest in oil in Venezuela is an example. The US is unable to provide a long-term and effective ‘American solution’ for the development of Latin American countries.

Over the years, the relationship between China and Latin America has grown in structural resilience driven by development needs. Latin American countries generally face structural problems, such as infrastructure deficiencies, lagging industrialization, and increasing social inequality. But China has significant comparative advantages in infrastructure construction, manufacturing, energy transition, and poverty reduction.

The cooperation between China and Latin America focuses on development, has the characteristic of ‘de-ideologization,’ and is not based on political systems and values, making it more stably accepted amid changing political factions in Latin America. Moreover, there are many young people in Latin America who have a low dependence on traditional Western brands and a high acceptance of emerging Chinese brands.

Chinese electronic products and new energy vehicles are widely popular in the Latin American market. The local production, joint research and development, and job creation of Chinese enterprises in Latin American countries are transforming the bilateral relationship from a substitute trade partner to an inexorable interest community, significantly enhancing the irreversibility of the cooperation.

The author is Zhang Qi, director of the US Foreign Policy and Non-Governmental Organizations Research Center at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies.

Editor: Futura Costaglione